securirity_flags.inc has some packages that are not compiled with -fstack-protector-strong. Instead they should be tried to compile with CFLAGS +="-fstack-protector" to provide at least partial stack buffer overrun protection.
The difference between the two is that strong protector adds a stack guard to more functions than the regular protector does, but otherwise the protection technique is same. We can try, but I have a hunch that the failing packages will still fail. It's not a lot of packages by the way - grub, gcc, glibc, uclibc and valgrind.
I also share the suspicion that they will fail but we could try it. I guess glibc is the main concern.
I checked all of those; the only ones where removing stack protection is no longer necessary are gcc-sanitizers and libgcc (in fact, they even work with full SECURITY_NO_PIE_CFLAGS now). I'll do a world build, then send a patch.
Patch is in master: 088120816835bfab2a675eb3f265b63290d077e6